基式外交：应对伊朗的下一步行动 @《基式外交研究》2025年第20期

作者：亨利・A・基辛格

译者：大外交青年智库基式外交研究中心

来源：《基式外交研究》2025年第20期“经典文献重译”专栏文章

审定：基式外交研究中心学术委员会

文源：Kissinger, Henry A. "The Next Steps With Iran." The Washington Post, July 31, 2006.

声明：基式外交研究中心转载、编译与翻译的内容均为非商业性引用（学术研究），不作商用，版权归原作者所有。如有问题请即刻联系，如需转载请注明出处

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一、摘要

基辛格在文中指出，当前黎巴嫩与加沙冲突的根源指向伊朗核问题。尽管六国集团提出的谈判方案仍未获伊朗回应，但近东乱局可能成为历史转折点。伊朗面临双重挑战：既试图通过核武追求现代化，又受困于宗教极端主义传统。作者强调，唯有伊朗采纳符合国际秩序的现代主义与和平伊斯兰观，才能化解矛盾。基辛格警告，若六国集团对伊朗核计划的隐忍与伊朗的挑衅形成僵局，将导致多边秩序崩溃。历史教训表明，对侵略行为的妥协（如阿比西尼亚危机）会引发更大灾难。伊朗必须在意识形态与国家利益间作出抉择，而六国集团的外交目标应是迫使伊朗直面这一选择。作者对比中美建交经验，指出中国转向合作源于战略安全考量，而非外交技巧。伊朗与美国缺乏类似共识，其地区挑衅行为凸显战略意图模糊。当前伊朗拖延核谈判，试图积累核能力以增强地区影响力。六国集团需在技术进程使制裁失效前果断行动，建立国际核浓缩体系，并将核谈判与伊朗整体对外关系审查相结合。基辛格认为，美国需准备好维护防扩散努力，但同时应探索所有可行外交选项。强硬立场需与明确目标结合，既解决核危机，又为伊朗回归国际社会创造条件。最终，国际社会必须避免伊朗在关键地区实现帝国野心，同时为其和平发展提供空间。

二、中文

全球目光聚焦于黎巴嫩与加沙地带的战火，但事件背景不可避免地指向伊朗。令人遗憾的是，围绕伊朗核问题的外交进程始终滞后于事态发展。当黎巴嫩与以色列城镇遭受炮火袭击、以色列重新控制加沙部分区域时，所谓“六国集团”（美国、英国、法国、德国、俄罗斯、中国）于5月提出的核谈判方案仍在等待德黑兰的回应。或许伊朗将某些外交沟通中的恳求语气视为软弱不决的信号，抑或黎巴嫩的暴力冲突促使该国宗教领袖重新审视引发危机的风险。

无论从何种角度解读，当前近东乱局都可能成为历史转折点。伊朗或将逐渐领悟“意外后果定律”。而六国集团再也无法回避伊朗带来的双重挑战：一方面，核武追求象征着伊朗试图通过现代国家权力符号实现现代化；另一方面，这种诉求却由狂热的宗教极端主义推动，而该思想已使穆斯林中东地区停滞数百年。唯有伊朗采纳符合国际秩序的现代主义，并秉持与和平共处相容的伊斯兰观，这一矛盾才能在避免冲突的前提下得以解决。

迄至目前，六国集团对伊朗拒绝谈判的应对方案仍模糊不清，仅提出通过联合国安理会实施非特定制裁威胁。但若六国集团的隐忍克制与伊朗总统的挑衅谩骂形成僵局，最终导致事实上默许伊朗核计划，全球多边秩序前景将全面黯淡。若安理会五常加德国无法共同实现其公开承诺的目标，每个国家（尤其是六国成员）都将面临日益严峻的威胁——无论是激进伊斯兰组织的国内压力、恐怖主义行径，还是大规模杀伤性武器扩散必然引发的局部冲突。

此类灾难的历史隐喻并非1938年民主国家将捷克斯洛伐克德语区拱手相让的《慕尼黑协定》，而是1935年国际社会对墨索里尼入侵阿比西尼亚（埃塞俄比亚）的反应。慕尼黑会议上，民主国家认为希特勒的诉求在民族自决原则下具有某种合理性，只是对其手段感到反感。而在阿比西尼亚危机中，挑战性质不容置疑，国联以压倒性多数认定意大利的军事冒险为侵略行为并实施制裁，但面对制裁后果却退缩妥协，拒绝实施意大利无法承受的石油禁运。国联从此一蹶不振。若处理伊朗与朝鲜问题的六国机制遭遇类似失败，世界将陷入既无治理原则又无有效机构约束的核扩散泥沼。

一个现代化、强大且和平的伊朗有望成为地区稳定与发展的支柱。但这一切的前提是伊朗领导人必须明确其代表的是某种意识形态还是民族国家——其根本动机究竟是宗教圣战还是国际合作。六国集团外交的核心目标应是迫使伊朗直面这一抉择。

外交从来不是空中楼阁，其效力不取决于辞令机锋，而源自风险收益的精密权衡。克劳塞维茨“战争是外交通过其他手段的延续”这一著名论断，既揭示了外交的挑战也限定了其边界。战争可以迫使对手屈服，外交则需要唤起共识。军事胜利能让战胜国至少在短期内发号施令，而外交成功的标志是主要当事方基本满意——它应当（或努力）创造共同目标，至少在谈判议题上达成一致；否则协议难以持久。战争的风险在于突破客观界限，外交的大忌则是以程序替代目标。外交不应与油嘴滑舌混为一谈，它不是修辞表演，而是理念博弈。若外交沦为国内政治的作秀工具，只会助长而非化解激进挑战。

常有人主张，应对伊朗需要类似20世纪70年代促使中美关系正常化的外交智慧。但中国并非因高超外交技巧而改变立场，而是由于与苏联十年冲突升级，逐渐意识到其安全威胁更多来自北部边境不断集结的苏军，而非资本主义美国。中苏珍宝岛武装冲突加速了北京脱离苏联阵营的进程。

美国外交的贡献在于理解这些事件的战略意义并果断行动。尼克松政府并未说服中国改变其战略优先级，而是让中国确信：实施其战略需求是安全的，并将提升长远前景。美方通过聚焦地缘政治根本目标，同时搁置部分争议问题实现了这一点。1972年《上海公报》——首份中美联合公报——即象征这一进程。与惯例不同的是，公报在列出一系列持续分歧后，提出防止“第三方”（显然指苏联）谋求霸权的共同目标。

伊朗谈判的复杂性远超中美破冰。在中美接触前两年，双方通过微妙、互惠的象征性外交行动传递意图，默契达成对国际形势的并行认知，中国最终选择融入合作型世界。

反观伊朗与美国，连近似的世界观都不存在。伊朗对美国谈判提议报以嘲讽，并加剧地区紧张局势。即便黎巴嫩真主党越境袭击以色列及绑架以军士兵并非德黑兰直接策划，若实施者认为此举违背伊朗战略意图，此类事件也断不会发生。简言之，伊朗尚未明确其追求的世界秩序——或者说从国际稳定视角看，它已做出错误选择。若黎巴嫩危机能让六国集团外交产生紧迫感，并促使德黑兰态度转向务实，这场危机或将成为历史转折点。

迄至目前，伊朗一直在拖延时间。宗教领袖显然试图尽可能积累核能力，以便在暂停铀浓缩后仍能以重启核武计划为威胁，提升其地区影响力。

鉴于技术发展速度，一味隐忍极易沦为绥靖纵容。六国集团必须明确其信念的坚定程度，尤其要在技术进程使阻止铀浓缩目标失效前果断行动。在这一临界点到来前，必须就制裁达成共识。有效制裁必须全面彻底，半心半意的象征性措施只会集各种弊端之大成。盟国间磋商必须避免重蹈国联在阿比西尼亚问题上的迟疑覆辙。我们应从朝核谈判中汲取教训：切勿在内部及谈判集团内部久拖不决，致使对方趁机增强核能力。同时，美国的合作伙伴也需及时做出决策，以便协调行动。

暂停铀浓缩不应是谈判终点。下一步应按俄罗斯提议，建立由国际管控、在全球指定中心进行的核燃料浓缩体系。这将缓解对伊朗的歧视性争议，并为核能开发树立范式，避免每个新参与者引发核危机。

布什总统已宣布美国愿参与六国与伊朗的谈判，以阻止伊朗核武计划。但核谈判无法与全面审视伊朗整体对外关系割裂开来。

人质危机的历史积怨、数十年的孤立状态以及伊朗政权的弥赛亚情结，构成此类外交的巨大障碍。若德黑兰执意将波斯帝国传统与当代伊斯兰狂热相结合，与美国——乃至六国谈判伙伴——的冲突将不可避免。绝不能允许伊朗在这个对全球至关重要的地区实现其帝国统治梦想。

与此同时，一个专注于开发本国人才与资源的伊朗无需惧怕美国。尽管难以想象在现任总统领导下，伊朗会参与需要其放弃恐怖主义活动或停止支持真主党等组织的谈判进程，但这一认知应通过谈判过程逐渐显现，而非成为拒绝谈判的理由。这种策略意味着重新定义政权更迭目标，为伊朗无论谁掌权都提供真正改变方向的机会。

至关重要的是，将此类政策转化为可透明核查的明确目标。地缘政治对话无法替代核浓缩危机的早期解决方案。该问题必须单独、迅速且坚定地予以解决。但能否将在此问题上的强硬立场理解为邀请伊朗回归国际社会的第一步，将在很大程度上决定全局。

最终，美国必须做好准备维护其阻止伊朗核武计划的努力。为此，美国有责任探索所有体面的替代方案。

三、英文

The world's attention is focused on the fighting in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, but the context leads inevitably back to Iran. Unfortunately, the diplomacy dealing with that issue is constantly outstripped by events. While explosives are raining on Lebanese and Israeli towns and Israel reclaims portions of Gaza, the proposal to Iran in May by the so-called Six (the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China) for negotiations on its nuclear weapons program still awaits an answer. It's possible that Tehran reads the almost pleading tone of some communications addressed to it as a sign of weakness and irresolution. Or perhaps the violence in Lebanon has produced second thoughts among the mullahs about the risks of courting and triggering crisis.

However the tea leaves are read, the current Near Eastern upheaval could become a turning point. Iran may come to appreciate the law of unintended consequences. For their part, the Six can no longer avoid dealing with the twin challenges that Iran poses. On the one hand, the quest for nuclear weapons represents Iran's reach for modernity via the power symbol of the modern state; at the same time, this claim is put forward by a fervent kind of religious extremism that has kept the Muslim Middle East unmodernized for centuries. This conundrum can be solved without conflict only if Iran adopts a modernism consistent with international order and a view of Islam compatible with peaceful coexistence.

Heretofore the Six have been vague about their response to an Iranian refusal to negotiate, except for unspecific threats of sanctions through the United Nations Security Council. But if a deadlock between strained forbearance by the Six and taunting invective from the Iranian president leads to de facto acquiescence in the Iranian nuclear program, prospects for multilateral international order will dim everywhere. If the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany are unable jointly to achieve goals to which they have publicly committed themselves, every country, especially those composing the Six, will face growing threats, be they increased domestic pressure from radical Islamic groups, terrorist acts or the nearly inevitable conflagrations sparked by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The analogy of such a disaster is not Munich, when the democracies yielded the German-speaking part of Czechoslovakia to Hitler, but the response when Mussolini invaded Abyssinia. At Munich, the democracies thought that Hitler's demands were essentially justified by the principle of self-determination; they were repelled mostly by his methods. In the Abyssinian crisis, the nature of the challenge was uncontested. By a vast majority, the League of Nations voted to treat the Italian adventure as aggression and to impose sanctions. But they recoiled before the consequences of their insight and rejected an oil embargo, which Italy would have been unable to overcome. The league never recovered from that debacle. If the six-nation forums dealing with Iran and North Korea suffer comparable failures, the consequence will be a world of unchecked proliferation, not controlled by either governing principles or functioning institutions.

A modern, strong, peaceful Iran could become a pillar of stability and progress in the region. This cannot happen unless Iran's leaders decide whether they are representing a cause or a nation — whether their basic motivation is crusading or international cooperation. The goal of the diplomacy of the Six should be to oblige Iran to confront this choice.

Diplomacy never operates in a vacuum. It persuades not by the eloquence of its practitioners but by assembling a balance of incentives and risks. Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is a continuation of diplomacy by other means defines both the challenge and the limits of diplomacy. War can impose submission; diplomacy needs to evoke consensus. Military success enables the victor in war to prescribe, at least for an interim period. Diplomatic success occurs when the principal parties are substantially satisfied; it creates — or should strive to create — common purposes, at least regarding the subject matter of the negotiation; otherwise no agreement lasts very long. The risk of war lies in exceeding objective limits; the bane of diplomacy is to substitute process for purpose. Diplomacy should not be confused with glibness. It is not an oratorical but a conceptual exercise. When it postures for domestic audiences, radical challenges are encouraged rather than overcome.

It is often asserted that what is needed in relation to Iran is a diplomacy comparable to that which, in the 1970s, moved China from hostility to cooperation with the United States. But China was not persuaded by skillful diplomacy to enter this process. Rather, China was brought, by a decade of escalating conflict with the Soviet Union, to a conviction that the threat to its security came less from capitalist America than from the growing concentration of Soviet forces on its northern borders. Clashes of Soviet and Chinese military forces along the Ussuri River accelerated Beijing's retreat from the Soviet alliance.

The contribution of American diplomacy was to understand the significance of these events and to act on that knowledge. The Nixon administration did not convince China that it needed to change its priorities. Its role was to convince China that implementing its strategic necessities was safe and would enhance China's long-term prospects. It did so by concentrating the diplomatic dialogue on fundamental geopolitical objectives, while keeping some contentious items in abeyance. The Shanghai Communique of 1972, the first Sino-U.S. communique, symbolized this process. Contrary to established usage, it listed a series of continuing disagreements as a prelude to the key common objective of preventing hegemonic aspirations of unnamed third parties — clearly implying the Soviet Union.

The challenge of the Iranian negotiation is far more complex. For two years before the opening to China, the two sides had engaged in subtle, reciprocal, symbolic and diplomatic actions to convey their intentions. In the process, they had tacitly achieved a parallel understanding of the international situation, and China opted for seeking to live in a cooperative world.

Nothing like that has occurred between Iran and the United States. There is not even an approximation of a comparable world view. Iran has reacted to the American offer to enter negotiations with taunts, and has inflamed tensions in the region. Even if the Hezbollah raids from Lebanon into Israel and the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers were not planned in Tehran, they would not have occurred had their perpetrators thought them inconsistent with Iranian strategy. In short, Iran has not yet made the choice of the world it seeks — or it has made the wrong choice from the point of view of international stability. The crisis in Lebanon could mark a watershed if it confers a sense of urgency to the diplomacy of the Six and a note of realism to the attitudes in Tehran.

Up to now Iran has been playing for time. The mullahs apparently seek to accumulate as much nuclear capability as possible so that, even were they to suspend enrichment, they would be in a position to use the threat of resuming their weapons effort as a means to enhance their clout in the region.

Given the pace of technology, patience can easily turn into evasion. The Six will have to decide how serious they will be in insisting on their convictions. Specifically, the Six will have to be prepared to act decisively before the process of technology makes the objective of stopping uranium enrichment irrelevant. Well before that point is reached, sanctions will have to be agreed on. To be effective, they must be comprehensive; halfhearted, symbolic measures combine the disadvantage of every course of action. Interallied consultations must avoid the hesitation that the League of Nations conveyed over Abyssinia. We must learn from the North Korean negotiations not to engage in a process involving long pauses to settle disagreements within the administration and within the negotiating group, while the other side adds to its nuclear potential. There is equal need, on the part of America's partners, for decisions permitting them to pursue a parallel course.

A suspension of enrichment of uranium should not be the end of the process. A next step should be the elaboration of a global system of nuclear enrichment to take place in designated centers around the world under international control — as proposed for Iran by Russia. This would ease implications of discrimination against Iran and establish a pattern for the development of nuclear energy without a crisis with each entrant into the nuclear field.

President Bush has announced America's willingness to participate in the discussions of the Six with Iran to prevent emergence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. But it will not be possible to draw a line between nuclear negotiations and a comprehensive review of Iran's overall relations to the rest of the world.

The legacy of the hostage crisis, the decades of isolation and the messianic aspect of the Iranian regime represent huge obstacles to such a diplomacy. If Tehran insists on combining the Persian imperial tradition with contemporary Islamic fervor, then a collision with America — and, indeed, with its negotiating partners of the Six — is unavoidable. Iran simply cannot be permitted to fulfill a dream of imperial rule in a region of such importance to the rest of the world.

At the same time, an Iran concentrating on the development of the talents of its people and the resources of its country should have nothing to fear from the United States. Hard as it is to imagine that Iran, under its present president, will participate in an effort that would require it to abandon its terrorist activities or its support for such instruments as Hezbollah, the recognition of this fact should emerge from the process of negotiation rather than being the basis for a refusal to negotiate. Such an approach would imply the redefinition of the objective of regime change, providing an opportunity for a genuine change in direction by Iran, whoever is in power.

It is important to express such a policy in precise objectives capable of transparent verification. A geopolitical dialogue is not a substitute for an early solution of the nuclear enrichment crisis. That must be addressed separately, rapidly and firmly. But a great deal depends on whether a strong stand on that issue is understood as the first step in the broader invitation to Iran to return to the wider world.

In the end, the United States must be prepared to vindicate its efforts to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapons program. For that reason, America has an obligation to explore every honorable alternative.

四、译文拾贝

Six

中文解释：六国集团，指美国、英国、法国、德国、俄罗斯和中国组成的国际谈判团体，针对伊朗核问题。

英文语境："the proposal to Iran in May by the so-called Six... for negotiations on its nuclear weapons program"

Nuclear weapons program

中文解释：核武器计划，伊朗发展核武器的系统性计划。

英文语境："negotiations on its nuclear weapons program still awaits an answer"

Sanctions

中文解释：制裁，国际社会通过经济或政治手段对某国施压的行为。

英文语境："unspecific threats of sanctions through the United Nations Security Council"

United Nations Security Council

中文解释：联合国安理会，联合国负责维护国际和平与安全的核心机构。

英文语境："sanctions through the United Nations Security Council"

Munich

中文解释：慕尼黑协定，1938年英法对纳粹德国绥靖政策的象征事件。

英文语境："The analogy of such a disaster is not Munich... but the response when Mussolini invaded Abyssinia"

League of Nations

中文解释：国际联盟，一战后成立的国际组织，因未能阻止侵略而失败。

英文语境："The league never recovered from that debacle"

Proliferation

中文解释：扩散，大规模杀伤性武器（如核武器）的扩散。

英文语境："a world of unchecked proliferation... weapons of mass destruction"

Conflagrations

中文解释：战火/冲突，大规模暴力冲突或战争。

英文语境："nearly inevitable conflagrations sparked by the proliferation"

Clausewitz's dictum

中文解释：克劳塞维茨名言，卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨提出的“战争是政治的延续”。

英文语境："Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is a continuation of diplomacy"

Shanghai Communique

中文解释：上海公报，1972年中美首份联合公报，标志关系正常化。

英文语境："The Shanghai Communique of 1972... symbolized this process"

Hegemonic aspirations

中文解释：霸权野心，某国追求区域或全球主导地位的企图。

英文语境："preventing hegemonic aspirations of unnamed third parties"

Hezbollah

中文解释：真主党，黎巴嫩什叶派武装组织，受伊朗支持。

英文语境："Even if the Hezbollah raids from Lebanon into Israel..."

Uranium enrichment

中文解释：铀浓缩，核技术关键步骤，可用于和平或武器目的。

英文语境："the objective of stopping uranium enrichment irrelevant"

Regime change

中文解释：政权更迭，通过外部干预改变某国政权。

英文语境："the redefinition of the objective of regime change"

Terrorist activities

中文解释：恐怖活动，非国家行为体发动的暴力袭击。

英文语境："require Iran to abandon its terrorist activities"

Geopolitical dialogue

中文解释：地缘政治对话，基于地理位置与权力平衡的国际谈判。

英文语境："A geopolitical dialogue is not a substitute for an early solution"

International control

中文解释：国际监管，多边机构对敏感技术或资源的监督。

英文语境："nuclear enrichment... under international control"

Comprehensive sanctions

中文解释：全面制裁，覆盖经济、贸易等多领域的制裁。

英文语境："To be effective, they must be comprehensive"

Oil embargo

中文解释：石油禁运，禁止某国石油出口或进口的措施。

英文语境："rejected an oil embargo, which Italy would have been unable to overcome"

Balance of incentives

中文解释：激励平衡，外交中权衡奖励与惩罚的策略。

英文语境："diplomacy... by assembling a balance of incentives and risks"

Strategic necessities

中文解释：战略必要性，国家为安全必须采取的核心行动。

英文语境："implementing its strategic necessities was safe"

Multilateral international order

中文解释：多边国际秩序，基于多国合作与规则的国际体系。

英文语境："prospects for multilateral international order will dim everywhere"

Radical Islamic groups

中文解释：激进伊斯兰组织，主张极端宗教意识形态的团体。

英文语境："increased domestic pressure from radical Islamic groups"

Functioning institutions

中文解释：有效机制，能实际运作的国际组织或制度。

英文语境："not controlled by... functioning institutions"

Unintended consequences

中文解释：意外后果，行动引发的非预期结果。

英文语境："Iran may come to appreciate the law of unintended consequences"

Crusading vs. international cooperation

中文解释：圣战vs.国际合作，意识形态对抗与国际协作的二元选择。

英文语境："whether their basic motivation is crusading or international cooperation"

Symbolic measures

中文解释：象征性措施，形式意义大于实际效果的举措。

英文语境："halfhearted, symbolic measures combine the disadvantage"

Interallied consultations

中文解释：盟国间磋商，同盟国家间的政策协调。

英文语境："Interallied consultations must avoid the hesitation..."

Negotiating group

中文解释：谈判小组，代表国家或集团进行谈判的团队。

英文语境："settle disagreements within the negotiating group"

Nuclear potential

中文解释：核潜力，某国发展核武器的潜在能力。

英文语境："the other side adds to its nuclear potential"

Transparent verification

中文解释：透明核查，可公开监督的验证机制。

英文语境："express such a policy in precise objectives capable of transparent verification"

Geopolitical objectives

中文解释：地缘政治目标，基于地理战略的国家利益目标。

英文语境："concentrating the diplomatic dialogue on fundamental geopolitical objectives"

Abeyance

中文解释：暂停/搁置，暂时搁置争议或行动。

英文语境："keeping some contentious items in abeyance"

Common purposes

中文解释：共同目标，多方认可的合作方向。

英文语境："it creates — or should strive to create — common purposes"

Diplomatic success

中文解释：外交成功，通过谈判达成各方满意的结果。

英文语境："Diplomatic success occurs when the principal parties are satisfied"

Military success

中文解释：军事成功，通过武力实现战略目标。

英文语境："Military success enables the victor in war to prescribe"

Balance of risks

中文解释：风险平衡，外交中权衡风险与收益的策略。

英文语境："diplomacy... by assembling a balance of incentives and risks"

Domestic audiences

中文解释：国内观众，国家内部公众或政治支持者。

英文语境："When it postures for domestic audiences, radical challenges are encouraged"

Radical challenges

中文解释：激进挑战，对现有秩序或规则的极端反对。

英文语境："radical challenges are encouraged rather than overcome"

Security threats

中文解释：安全威胁，对国家或国际安全的潜在危险。

英文语境："the threat to its security came less from capitalist America"

International stability

中文解释：国际稳定，全球或地区层面的和平与秩序。

英文语境："the wrong choice from the point of view of international stability"

Regional stability

中文解释：地区稳定，特定地理区域的和平与安全。

英文语境："a pillar of stability and progress in the region"

Imperial rule

中文解释：帝国统治，通过强权控制他国或地区。

英文语境："Iran simply cannot be permitted to fulfill a dream of imperial rule"

Diplomatic actions

中文解释：外交行动，国家通过外交手段采取的措施。

英文语境："subtle, reciprocal, symbolic and diplomatic actions"

Symbolic actions

中文解释：象征性行动，具有政治象征意义但实际影响有限的行为。

英文语境："subtle, reciprocal, symbolic and diplomatic actions"

Comprehensive review

中文解释：全面审查，对某议题的系统性评估。

英文语境："a comprehensive review of Iran's overall relations"

Genuine change

中文解释：真正改变，实质性的政策或方向调整。

英文语境："providing an opportunity for a genuine change in direction"

Policy redefinition

中文解释：政策重新定义，调整或更新原有政策目标。

英文语境："the redefinition of the objective of regime change"

Verified objectives

中文解释：可验证目标，需通过核查确认的协议条款。

英文语境："express such a policy in precise objectives capable of transparent verification"

Honorable alternative

中文解释：体面选择，既能维护尊严又能解决问题的外交选项。

英文语境："America has an obligation to explore every honorable alternative"